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ABSTRACT
Key management is the pillar of a security architecture. Body sensor networks (BSNs) pose several challenges – some
inherited from wireless sensor networks (WSNs), some unique to themselves – that require a new key management scheme
to be tailor-made. The challenge is taken on, and the result is KALwEN, a new parameterized key management scheme
that combines the best-suited cryptographic techniques in a seamless framework. KALwEN is user-friendly in the sense
that it requires no expert knowledge of a user, and instead only requires a user to follow a simple set of instructions when
bootstrapping or extending a network. One of KALwEN’s key features is that it allows sensor devices from different
manufacturers, which expectedly do not have any pre-shared secret, to establish secure communications with each other.
KALwEN is decentralized, such that it does not rely on the availability of a local processing unit (LPU). KALwEN
supports secure global broadcast, local broadcast and local (neighbor-to-neighbor) unicast, while preserving past key
secrecy and future key secrecy. The fact that the cryptographic protocols of KALwEN have been formally verified also
makes a convincing case. With both formal verification and experimental evaluation, our results should appeal to theorists
and practitioners alike.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Specialized WSNs called BSNs are facilitating a revolution
in the healthcare industry. A BSN is a wireless network of
small, low-cost, biosensors worn (i.e., implantable sensors
are excluded from this study as they require a different
approach) by a human user, for the purpose of monitoring
the user’s physiological parameters, e.g., ECG, SpO2,
blood pressure etc [1].
The classic architecture of a BSN consists of a network
of biosensors and an on-body local processing unit (LPU)
– a device with a GUI and an input interface such as a PDA
or mobile phone – directly or indirectly connected to a
remote server storing the user’s records [2]. An LPU is also
simply called a controller by some researchers. However,
for practical purposes that include avoiding a single point
of failure, in our reference architecture, we do not stipulate
the presence of an LPU. The number of nodes is up to
a few dozens. All nodes are capable of far-field (radio)
communication.
The security and privacy problems related to healthcare
systems are real [3]. As a recent study has demonstrated,
medical devices that do not support any confidentiality
and authentication function are prone to eavesdropping and
attacks [4]. Solving these problems requires data confiden-
tiality and authentication. Providing data confidentiality
and authentication in turn requires a key management
scheme to put the cryptographic keys in place. A practical
key management scheme has to take into account the con-
straints of a BSN. To properly motivate these constraints,
we first review two user scenarios.
User Scenario 1 One of the classical applications for
BSNs is real-time fall detection, because tripping is
known to be one of the major causes of death among
the elderly [5]. A typical system consists of multiple
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sensors embedded in the user’s shoe soles. With existing
technology, these sensors can detect after a fall event has
happened, so as to alert the caregiver. In this case, a mobile
phone connected to the sensors can be programmed to send
a text to the caregiver in case of emergency. The ultimate
goal however is to detect when a fall is about to happen,
and prevent it from happening. A recent study shows that
by applying vibratory stimuli to the sole, it is possible
to stabilize the user [6]. In a system like this, vibratory
actuators implement the countermeasure, rendering an
LPU redundant. A subset of the security requirements is as
such: communication from the sensors to the LPU should
be authenticated, to prevent prank text messages to be sent;
communication from the sensors to the actuators should be
authenticated, to minimize discomfort for the user.
User Scenario 2 We give another user scenario from
the Ambient Living with Embedded Network (ALwEN)
project (https://www.alwen.nl). Patients who suffer from
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) often
experience dyspnea (shortness of breath). For fear of
triggering dyspnea by exercising, COPD patients are
often trapped in a vicious cycle between lack of exercise
and deteriorating health. A sensor system is being
designed to measure a patient’s ECG and breathing, and
record his/her activity, with the primary objective of
encouraging the patient exercise more without triggering
dyspnea. To correlate the ECG and respiratory signal, time
synchronization among the nodes is required. To prevent
false alarm, the nodes need to exchange information to
generate the proper context, e.g., “the patient’s heartbeat
is accelerating in correlation with emotion”, “the patient’s
heartbeat is accelerating in correlation with exercise” etc.
Constraints and requirements In view of User Scenar-
ios 1 and 2, here are the constraints and requirements that
KALwEN is designed to address:
1. Usability: The key management process has to be
autonomous enough so that barring some simple
instructions a user has to follow, it requires no
expert knowledge whatsoever of the user. It should
be intuitive enough so that the user can operate the
system in the comfort of his/her own home, without
the need for a medical personnel or healthcare
worker.
2. Interoperability: Sensor devices from different
manufacturers should interoperate. For example,
their hardware IDs should be globally unique. Also,
due to their different origins, these nodes should
not be required to store any pre-shared secret. The
nodes must be able to establish session keys without
relying on specific sensing capabilities.
3. Hardware: BSNs have the same hardware con-
straints as WSNs do, i.e., limited computational
power, limited memory, limited bandwidth and lim-
ited energy. Moreover, a sensor node is typically not
tamper-resistant.
4. LPU: When BSNs evolve from WSNs, they lose
the dependability of a base station, because a BSN
might not be connected to a base station at all
times as the user moves about. In many designs, the
LPU replaces the base station as the trusted third
party, despite the outcome that the LPU becomes
the single point of failure, and the fact that the
LPU could be physically just as vulnerable as other
nodes in the network. In our reference architecture,
we relax the assumption of a base station and an
LPU. This seemingly harsh constraint caters for
all the foreseeable reasons why an LPU might not
be available: most of the time it puts a weight on
the user without achieving much; it is potentially
costly; it could be hard to operate by an elderly. By
not assuming either a base station or an LPU to be
a permanent fixture of a BSN, we make it possible
for KALwEN to be applicable to diverse network
architectures, with the added benefit of being inter-
manufacturer operable. To apply KALwEN to a
network where an LPU is available, we treat the
LPU as a regular node.
5. In-network processing: The main motivation for
sensor networks is processing data in the network
instead of collecting raw data. This is essential for
context generation as evident in User Scenario 2,
and for reducing usage of bandwidth, energy and
storage.
While it is paramount for implantable medical devices
to provide emergency accessibility mechanisms, BSNs
are generally only for monitoring and it is likely that
an emergency personnel has and should prefer to use
their own equipment to diagnose the user, so emergency
accessibility of a BSN is less critical. Since we are not
addressing implantable sensors, any sensor that “gets in the
way” can just be switched off and set aside.
Contribution Our objective is to propose a key
management scheme under the above constraints. Our
contribution is KALwEN (short for Key management
for ALwEN). KALwEN combines the most relevant
techniques in the literature in a complete framework.
KALwEN satisfies the above-mentioned constraints or
requirements, and supports the three basic communication
modes: global broadcast, local broadcast and local unicast,
while preserving past key secrecy and future key secrecy.
Using formal verification, we show that the cryptographic
protocols of KALwEN are secure. KALwEN is an
unconventional design with the primary purpose of
creating a level playing field for body sensor vendors, in
which devices of different manufacturers can interoperate;
and the secondary purpose of freeing the users from the
burden of operating a computer and carrying an LPU.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3
introduces the building blocks of KALwEN. Section 4
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gives an overview of KALwEN. Section 5 describes
the threat model and the assumptions based on which
KALwEN is built. Sections 6 to 10 specify the protocols
for the factory phase, bootstrap phase, deployment phase
and operation phase of a BSN. Sections 11 and 12
present our formal verification and experimental results
respectively. In Section 13, we discuss in detail the merits
of KALwEN compared to some existing schemes, and
attempt to dissolve some common misunderstanding and
criticism of KALwEN. Finally, Section 14 concludes.
2. RELATED WORK
BSNs, being descended from WSNs, can benefit from the
many ideas that have already been proposed for WSNs. In
fact, key management ideas can be borrowed from many
other areas. Our discussion is divided into the following
subsections: WSNs, ubiquitous computing and healthcare
sensor networks.
Wireless Sensor Networks Perrig et al. [7] pioneer the
use of one-way hash chains in the form of µTESLA to
achieve authenticated broadcast in WSNs. Anderson et
al. [8] suggest that during the bootstrapping phase of a
network, keys can be exchanged in the clear. LEAP+ [9]
and its improved variants [10] suggest that during the
short time before a node is likely to be compromised,
a node can use its so-called initial key (a system-wide
transitory master key) to establish secure channels with
all its neighbors, before deleting the initial key. Kuo et
al. [11] propose establishing a pairwise key between a
base station and each node in a Faraday cage. However,
for bootstrapping multiple nodes at the same time, the
nodes are required to be of the same type. Kuo et al. also
recommend using software attestation [12] to make sure
all the nodes are uncompromised before the pairwise keys
are transmitted in the clear within the Faraday cage. In
combination with Diffie-Hellman key agreement, software
attestation can be used for key establishment [13]. The
catch is, software attestation works only (i) when the
verifier has the same software as the prover’s, and (ii) when
a verifier knows the exact make and model of a sensor
node’s CPU. Castellucia et al. describe more pitfalls of
software attestation in a recent work [14].
The random key pre-distribution paradigm is pioneered
by Eschenauer et al. [15] and later extended by Liu et
al. [16] and Du et al. [17]. The idea is to prepare a
pool of “keying material” (which can be single symmetric
keys [15], polynomials [16] or matrices [17]), called the
key pool; and to each sensor node, distribute a fixed-size
subset of keying material randomly chosen from the key
pool (a node’s keying material is called the node’s key
ring). Two neighbors are able to establish a pairwise key
when they share at least a key. Two neighbors that do
not share a key must use a common trusted neighbor to
establish a pairwise key – the number of neighbors that are
involved in the process is called the key-path length. The
paradigm is particularly useful for limiting key storage per
node in large-scale WSNs.
Later extensions of random key pre-distribution
introduce deterministic, combinatorial designs – each
key ring is drawn from the key pool in a deterministic
fashion according to some combinatorial rules. For brevity,
we call this paradigm combinatorial key pre-distribution.
Various combinatorial designs have been proposed [18,
19, 20]. With respect to a fixed key ring size, the
various designs enable different trade-offs on the following
parameters: probability of key-share, average key-path
length, resilience to node capture. The conclusion so far
is that except for really small networks (if the number
of nodes n is small, a node can afford to store n− 1
keys, one for every other node), combinatorial key pre-
distribution seems to be the direction forward for WSNs,
and by extension BSNs.
Ubiquitous Computing Ideas from ubiquitous comput-
ing can also be useful. The literature of this area primarily
focuses on secure pairing [21]. Secure pairing is a solution
to the key establishment problem between two strangers
with no prior shared secret. The standard solution is to
use a band-limited side channel to exchange short secrets
and based on the short secrets establish a session key. The
usage of four-digit PINs in Bluetooth is a classic example,
although a relatively insecure one. Saxena et al.’s “Blink
’Em All” [22] uses the visual channel as the band-limited
side channel and the wireless channel as the insecure pub-
lic channel. The wireless channel is used for transmitting
initial commitments whereas the visual channel is used for
transmitting short authenticated strings, as part of the pro-
tocol designed by Laur et al. [23]. Another example is to
exchange keys in the open, e.g., by signaling in the source
field of the packets, as long as an attacker cannot tell where
the packets originate from [24, 25]. Another paradigm is to
derive a common key by sampling similar side channels.
For example, co-located devices experience similar radio
environments [26]; devices shaken together can establish
a common key [27]. Other examples that are based on
this paradigm involve a pair of human users exchanging
visual information, but these are not as useful [28, 29]
for BSNs. By extension, two devices sensing the same
or similar physiological signals should be able to derive
a common key. This biometric extension is first proposed
by Cherukuri et al. [30] for BSNs. Later work investigates
the feasibility of using the heartrate variability [31], the
interval pulse [32], the electrocardiogram [33, 34] as the
biometrics. When all the nodes in a network are capable
of sensing the same type of signal, these results are
applicable, and all the nodes can establish a common group
key. Our goal is to handle the general case, i.e., where there
is a chance that there is no overlap in sensing capabilities
among the nodes.
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Healthcare Sensor Networks Complete key manage-
ment schemes have only started appearing in recent years.
Blinking LEDs Indicated Group (BLIG) is an approach
where nodes exhibit a synchronized blinking pattern when
they are securely grouped [35]. BLIG is different from
Blink ’Em All, in that the former uses public-key cryptog-
raphy for key establishment and the visual channel only for
verification by a human user that the protocol completes
successfully [36], whereas the latter uses the visual channel
for signaling short strings. BLIG has been incorporated
by Keoh et al. [37] and Li et al. [38] into their protocols.
In Section 13, we provide a detailed comparison between
BLIG, Keoh et al.’s scheme [37], Li et al.’s scheme [38],
and KALwEN.
Some key management architectures rely on a local
base station to authenticate sensor nodes biometrically [39,
40]. In another architecture [41], secure interaction
between “patient security processors”, “clinician security
processors”, “nurse security processors” and a central
server is facilitated by a key establishment scheme. These
architectures are more useful for dedicated healthcare
facilities than for ambient-assisted living scenarios.
3. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the “building blocks” that we use
to construct KALwEN. Table I partially summarizes the
symbols used in this paper.
3.1. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
Without any prior shared secret, two nodes can establish a
session key using the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement
protocol [42]. Over the years, the original DH protocol
has been heavily extended. Among the numerous variants
that exist in the literature, the variant discussed here is
the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) scheme [43,
Section 6.1] using the elliptic curve cofactor Diffie-
Hellman primitive (which is resistant to small subgroup
attacks compared to the original primitive) [43, Section
3.3.2]. The security of ECDH hinges on the intractability
of finding l such that lG = Q given G, a point on an
elliptic curve of large prime order, andQ, a scalar multiple
of G. Recent implementation results show that while
ECDH is computationally expensive, it is achievable at a
time cost of the order of seconds, a ROM cost of under
20 KB and a RAM cost of around 2 KB, i.e., within the
capabilities of a typical sensor node [44].
An elliptic curve cryptosystem is built on a set of
domain parameters denoted by (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h) (see
Table I for explanation). Suppose node u has private/public
key pair (du, duG) whereas node v has private/public
key pair (dv, dvG). Then the session key Kuv between
u and v is derived as follows: (i) u and v exchange
their public keys; (ii) u computes (x, y) = hdudvG and
v computes the same point; (iii) if (x, y) = (0, 0) then
stop, otherwise Kuv = KDF (x), where KDF () is a key
Table I. Partial list of symbols
{·}K Encryption function using key K
[·]K Message authentication function using key K
H(·) Cryptographic hash function
‖ Concatenation operator
R← Uniformly chosen at random from
≫ Right shift operator
VSFC Set of all nodes excluding the key distribution center in
a Smart Faraday Cage
Nv Set of all neighbors of node v
IDv ID of node v
NID Network ID
(q, FR, a,
b, G, n, h)
Domain parameters of an elliptic curve: q is the order of
the finite field on which the curve is defined; FR is the
field representation; a and b are the coefficients of the
curve; G is the base point on the curve; n is a prime of
orderG; h is the number of rational points on the curve
divided by n
K Key space
KM Membership key (Section 8)
P , P Key pool (Section 2), P = | P |
κv , K Key ring of node v (Section 2), K = |κv |
CD(P, IDv) A function that returns to the node v, its key ring and
corresponding key indexes drawn from the key pool P
KID An array of key indices
KG Global key (Section 4)
K′ Renewed version of key K
Nv Nonce sent by v
τ The least number of nodes removed that will alert the
user; threshold of a secret sharing scheme
l Number of keys in a one-way hash chain
m Length of a hash
c Length of a counter
q Order of a finite field, or number of oracle queries,
depending on the context
derivation function (that typically invokes a hash function
multiple times). The reason for usingKDF () is that xmay
have some bits that can be predicted with non-negligible
advantage [45].
3.2. Combinatorial Key Pre-Distribution
We are solely interested in the type of scheme that ensures
that any pair of nodes have at least one key in common,
to ensure every pair of neighbors can establish a pariwise
key. While this type of schemes are in general less resilient
to node capture attacks than random key pre-distribution
schemes, these schemes are more user-friendly because
they incur less communication overhead at deployment.
Furthermore, an attacker cannot capture too many nodes
without alarming the user. Therefore high probability of
key-share takes precedence over resilience.
Suppose the key ring size is fixed at K. The simplistic
approach of setting the key pool size P = 2K − 1 and





combinatorial patterns to a
node would make sure any pair of nodes share at least a
key [46], but the resilience of this scheme is unsatisfactory
(capturing a node compromises half of the key pool). A
better approach is symmetric designs [20]. For a key ring
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size of K, there exists a symmetric design that supports
up to (K − 1)2 + (K − 1) + 1 nodes, and that ensures
any pair of nodes share exactly one key. The supported
network size seems to be sufficient for BSNs, for example,
when K = 10, the maximum network size is 91, which
is more than the size expected of a typical BSN. In
case the maximum supported network size is exceeded,




nodes [20], at the cost of reducing
the probability of key-share. We write CD() to denote
a function that outputs the key ring and key identifiers
allocated from a key pool to a node, i.e., (κv,KIDv) =
CD(P, IDv). Each “key” in a key ring in this context can
actually be a single symmetric key or a polynomial [47] (an
implementation of the polynomial-based variant for BSNs
has been reported [48]), depending on the desired level of
trade-off: using polynomials gives better resilience at the
cost of memory usage. The decision on whether to use
polynomials or symmetric keys can be safely deferred to
the time of actual implementation without sacrificing the
soundness of KALwEN.
3.3. One-way Hash Chain
The one-way hash chain [49] is a lightweight replacement
for asymmetric-key digital signatures. To bootstrap the
protocol, the sender s first generates a one-way hash chain
{Hs,l−1, Hs,l−2, ..., Hs,0}, where Hs,i = H(Hs,i+1)
(i = 0, ..., l − 2), H() is a cryptographic hash function
(the security requirements of which will be determined
shortly); and distributes Hs,0 (called the commitment of
the hash chain) to the receivers securely. To send message
Mi to the receivers, the sender broadcasts Mi‖[Mi]Hs,i .
When the sender is sure all the receivers have received
the message (which is trivial to achieve in a single-
hop network), the sender discloses Hs,i. The receivers
successfully authenticate Mi if (i) there exists a past
key Hs,j = H(i−j)(Hs,i) (0 ≤ j < i); and if (ii) Hs,i
generates [Mi]Hs,i .
The one-way hash chain is provably secure if the
hash function is l-wise independent [50]. However, the
probability of choosing such a function from the set of
all functions from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}m is impractically
small when l is large. In practice, a larger domain
for the hash function should be used; for example, by
coupling the hash chain with a chain of salts [51],
i.e., Hs,i = H(salts,i+1‖Hs,i+1). Meanwhile, Bradford
et al. [52] propose using a separate chain of counters
which do not need to be transmitted; they also propose
Hs,i = H(Hs,i+1‖Hs,i+2‖...). Throughout our ensuing
discussion, for clarity, we continue to write the one-
way hash chain in its original form, with the implicit
understanding that in implementation, the hash chain is
coupled with a chain of salts or counters. Moreover, to
facilitate the proof of Proposition 1, the hash function must
also be always preimage-resistant (aPre-secure [53]) and
indifferentiable from a random oracle [54].
3.4. Threshold Secret Sharing
The standard technique for sharing a secret between n
parties such that any τ or more parties can reconstruct
the secret is (τ, n)-threshold secret sharing [55]. If the
secret to be shared is S, then a random polynomial over




i ∈ Zq[x], where a0 = S, and q is
larger than the largest possible value of S. The shares are
distributed as f(IDi) (i = 1, ..., n), where IDi’s are the
individual IDs of the participants. Any τ or more shares are
enough to reconstruct S via Lagrange interpolation. τ − 1
or less shares reveal no information at all about S.
4. SCHEME OVERVIEW
We begin the overview by identifying the essential
keys that need to be established. Then we describe the
architecture of a node in terms of its life cycle, hardware
architecture and finite state machine. At the end of this
section, we also describe the equipment that is needed to
support the nodes.
KALwEN’s mission is to support authentication in
these communication modes: (i) local unicast, (ii)
local broadcast, (iii) global broadcast. The first two
communication modes are the basic operations of a
medium access protocol. Local broadcast is also a
primitive for in-network processing. Global broadcast is
necessary for announcing network-wide events. KALwEN
supports the communication modes with the following key
types:
• Confidential and authenticated local unicast by the
nodes: pairwise key
• Confidential and authenticated local broadcast by
the nodes: global key and cluster hash chain
• Confidential and authenticated global broadcast by
the key distribution center (KDC): global key and
global hash chain
A pairwise key is shared between two neighboring nodes.
The global key is shared among all the nodes. The
commitment of a cluster hash chain is shared by a node
with its neighbors. The commitment of the global hash
chain is shared by the KDC with all other nodes. The KDC
will be discussed later. Fig. 1(a) illustrates the distribution
of these keys in a network.
Node architecture We divide the life cycle of a node
into the following phases:
• Factory phase: Happens after the node is manufac-
tured and before the node is bootstrapped for the
first time.
• Bootstrap phase: Happens when the user bootstraps
the node in a controlled environment, and before the
user deploys the node.
• Deployment phase: Happens after the user boot-
straps the node, but before the node starts operating.
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Figure 1. (a) Essential key types; (b) simplified finite state machine of a node connecting the different phases
This is the time when the node tries to discover its
neighbors.
• Operation phase: Happens after the node has
discovered all its neighbors.
• Limbo phase: Happens after the node is removed
from the network. Before the node can be deployed
again, it must be re-bootstrapped.
When a node is switched on, its bootloader copies the
operating system (OS) from the external program memory
to the internal program memory, and then transfers control
to the OS in the internal program memory. All ephemeral
cryptographic keys are stored in the RAM, so that when
a node is switched off, all keys are lost. To reduce
accidental switch-ons/offs, a mechanism should be in place
that requires a certain amount of cognitive effort from
the user to switch on/off the device. An analogy for this
mechanism is readily found on most of today’s mobile
phones (switching on a phone requires the hang-up button
to be pressed for a few seconds).
Fig. 1(b) depicts the simplified finite state machine
(FSM) of a node. The inner working of this FSM shall
become clear as we describe the protocols in later sections.
Equipment To bootstrap a network, and to add a
node to a network, an additional equipment is needed:
a “Smart Faraday Cage” (SFC). A Faraday cage is a
metal enclosure for containing the electromagnetic fields
of the equipment within. A Faraday cage, although not
yet commercially available for BSNs, can already be
purchased for individual mobile devices∗. The kind of SFC
we require is a Faraday cage with imbued intelligence
such that it can also act as a KDC for the nodes to be
bootstrapped, i.e., the SFC and the KDC are the same
entity. The conceptual design of the SFC consists of the
following components:
1. a knob that can be set to one of the three modes: (i)
“Bootstrap” for bootstrapping nodes to form a new
network; (ii) “Standby” for writing everything in its
volatile memory to its nonvolatile memory before
∗For example, http://www.mobilecloak.com
going to sleep; (iii) “Add” for bootstrapping nodes
to be added to the previously bootstrapped network;
2. an indicator showing one of the three states:
“Working”, “Done” and “Error”;
3. and a jammer, attached to the exterior of the SFC,
that constantly transmits a noise signal when the
knob points to “Bootstrap” or “Add”.
One security requirement of the SFC is that it must be
dimensioned such that any two nodes in it are within range
of each other. The functional requirements of the SFC
are defined by the protocols the KDC has to follow, as
described in the following sections. It is to be emphasized
that an SFC is only needed when bootstrapping a network
or adding a node to a network. The SFC is a personal
device and is only used to bootstrap the owner’s sensor
nodes.
5. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
An attacker is computationally bounded. This is a standard
cryptographic assumption, implying even if the attacker
has access to supercomputers, its computing power is at
most polynomial.
Due to the small scale of the human body, a BSN
is fully connected. There exists a range around a BSN
outside which no attacker can eavesdrop on the messages
of the BSN, even with advanced skills and equipment
[56]†. When an attacker is in range, the attacker can
forge, intercept and arbitrarily manipulate any message, as
dictated by the Dolev-Yao model [57]. When an attacker is
out of range, the attacker can only forge messages.
The above are standard assumptions. Below we list
assumptions specific to KALwEN:
Assumption 1 Hardware-wise, an SFC is tamper-
resistant whereas a normal node is not. The SFC
†Hancke shows that the forward channel of ISO 14443A and ISO 15693 near-
field communication can be eavesdropped as far as 10m away, even though these
systems are advertised to operate within 10cm. It can be safely assumed that
commodity far-field communication can be eavesdropped at more than 10m away.
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acts as a “control center” for BSNs much like a base
station acts as a center of command for WSNs. If
the center of command is compromised, enforcing
any form of security is meaningless. The essential
rationale behind this assumption is that it is easier
to safeguard the security of a single component
rather than a host of smaller components that are
far less physically manageable.
Assumption 2 The time to read cryptographic keys out
of the RAM of a sensor node (in the order of
hours) is longer than the interval between the
keep-alive packets of a network (in the order of
minutes). We note that it is demonstrably possible
to extract keys from a Crossbow MICA2 node in
under one minute [58], but MICA2 is mostly a
research-purpose device with the Joint Test Action
Group (JTAG) interface fully exposed. Removing
the JTAG interface, using ball grid array chips for
the memory components [59, p.293], applying a
layer of epoxy around the memory components
are just some of the low-cost measures to make
a production device considerably harder to tamper
with.
Assumption 3 Physically, an attacker can get in-range
with a BSN for an indefinite amount of time, but
an attacker cannot try to remove τ or more nodes
without the user noticing. At the same time, a node
in a BSN has at least τ − 1 neighbors, i.e., the
network degree ≥ τ − 1. This assumption should
be realistic because τ is typically quite low (it is
not easy to ignore a few nodes missing from one’s
body).
6. FACTORY PHASE
In the factory phase, every node v is embedded with the
same set of domain parameters (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h)
(Section 3.1).
For all the protocols of KALwEN, it is vital that a
node can generate pseudorandom numbers with sufficient
randomness. There are ways to collect entropy for this
purpose, for example, by sampling the radio or on-board
sensors. As a supplement, every node can be embedded
with a unique seed, to be used as an input to the built-in
pseudorandom number generators.
All of the above also applies to SFCs.
7. BOOTSTRAP PHASE
The bootstrap process takes place in a controlled
environment. Apart from the nodes themselves, the user







































Figure 2. Procedure for bootstrapping nodes
1. set the SFC to “Bootstrap”, then switch on or reset
the nodes in close proximity of the SFC;
2. put the nodes in the SFC;
3. seal the SFC;
4. wait for the “Done” indicator and then deploy the
nodes.
The technical detail behind the instructions is given below.
Denote a node by v. When v is switched on, it senses
the medium for a signal. If a noise signal is sensed, v sets a
wake-up timer and goes to sleep until the wake-up timer
times out. This process continues until v wakes up and
senses no noise signal. This is the time when v has been
put into the SFC. It is clear at this stage that the purpose of
the jammer is two-fold: to prevent the nodes from initiating
bootstrap outside the SFC, and to prevent residual radiation
from within the SFC from being useful to any potential
eavesdropper.
Once v senses the channel is clear, it broadcasts a
HELLO packet. All nodes contend for the medium to
send their HELLO packets. Once the KDC stops hearing
HELLO packets, based on (i) the number of distinct
HELLO packets the KDC has received so far (which is
|VSFC | if all nodes have sent their HELLO packets, but
in anticipation for expansion, the KDC should add some
margin to the network size), and (ii) the minimum size
of a key ring K, the KDC computes the necessary key
pool size and generates a key pool P of that size. With
each node v, the KDC establishes a pairwise key Ksv
using ECDH. For v, the KDC allocate κv , a block of K
keys from P . To v, the KDC then dispatches κv and other
keying material encrypted using Ksv . Denote the KDC by
s, and the protocol is as follows:
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v → ∗ : IDv‖ID∗‖HELLO‖rvG‖Nv
s : rs
R←[1, n− 1]
Ksv is derived per Section 3.1
KM
R←K (detail later)
(κv,KIDv) = CD(P, IDv)
KG
R←K, Hs,l−1 R←{0, 1}m
Hs,i−1 = H(Hs,i)∀i ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}
θ = IDs‖IDv‖BOOT‖rsG‖Ns‖NID‖τ
‖{KM‖κv ‖KIDv‖KG}Ksv‖Hs,0
s→ v : θ‖[θ‖Nv]Ksv
v → s : IDv‖IDs‖[Ns]Ksv
Some notes about protocol listings:
• In Protocol 1, every message is explicitly prepended
with a source field and a destination field. Hereafter
however, the source field and the destination field
will be made implicit. If a message is appended with
a message authentication code (such as the message
s→ v), the code is implicitly calculated over the
source field and the destination field as well.
• Whenever we use the same key for encryption and
message authentication in the same message, we
are in fact using separate sub-keys derived from
the same key. For example, for the last message
in Protocol 1, we are actually using [1]Ksv and
[2]Ksv as the encryption key and the message
authentication key respectively, consistent with
convention [7]. For brevity, we use Ksv to denote
both sub-keys.
• While using message authentication code (MAC) is
the standard technique for message authentication,
an efficiency-enhancing alternative is to use
H(key‖message) if H can be modeled as a random
oracle [60].
As Protocol 1 does not authenticate public keys, it is
open to impersonation attacks. However, if say a malicious
node tries to impersonate v or the KDC, such action is
immediately detectable by v or the KDC, because every
node is within range of each other. If the attack is against v,
v would immediately alert the KDC, and the KDC would
immediately signal “Error” to the user. If the attack is
against the KDC, the KDC would directly signal “Error”
to the user. Consequently, impersonation attacks and hence
man-in-the-middle attacks are detectable in the specific
environment of the SFC.
KM is called the membership key because it will be
used to establish pairwise keys between neighboring nodes
in the deployment phase. After broadcasting KM , the
KDC only keeps H(KM ) instead of KM itself. Doing
so serves two purposes: (i) even when the KDC itself
is compromised, an attacker cannot obtain KM ; (ii) the
hash can be used in Protocol 3 to verify if the shares are
correctly recovered (more on this in Section 9).
If the protocol goes well without any impersonation
attack, after the KDC has finished bootstrapping all nodes,
the KDC signals “Done” to the user and the nodes are
ready for deployment.
8. DEPLOYMENT PHASE
Neighbor discovery takes place during the deployment
phase. Every node sets up a pairwise key with each of its
neighbors. Using the pairwise keys, the node distributes the






v : Kuv ← H(x) where x ∈ κu ∩κv
θ1 = KIDv‖Hv,0‖Nv
v → u: θ1‖[θ1]Kvu
u : Kuv ← H(x) where x ∈ κu ∩κv
u→ v : Hu,0‖[Hu,0‖Nv]Kuv
All legitimate nodes are supposed to have obtainedKM
in the bootstrap phase. Any outsider withoutKM is unable
to join the network.
After neighbor discovery (signalled by a certain time-





i ∈ Zq[x], (1)
where a0 = KM , ai = Hi(a0), and q is larger than
both the largest possible membership key and the largest
possible ID. Since f(x) is generated deterministically,
all nodes get the same coefficients ai (i = 0, ..., τ − 1).
Each node v then evaluates f(IDv), and discards all the
coefficients, as well as KM . This secret sharing scheme
ensures that at least τ shares of KM are required to
reconstructKM and this is the principle behind the process
of node addition, to be discussed later. Deleting KM
ensures that KM cannot be used to perform illegitimate
node addition.
At the end of the bootstrap phase, each node is capable
of secure unicast and secure local broadcast. Each node
can also authenticate broadcast from the KDC, when the
broadcast is relayed by a delegate node, as we shall discuss
in the next section.
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9. NODE ADDITION
Since a new node is considered trusted to be added to
a network, there seems to be no incentive in enforcing
past key secrecy (not to be confused with “perfect forward
secrecy”), which is the requirement that a new member
must not know old group (global) keys [61]. However, the
new node may actually turn out to be rogue, in which case
it is prudent to refresh the global key before admitting the
new node into the network.
The easiest but most inefficient way to add a node to
the network is to reset and bootstrap all nodes again. An
alternative solution is to have new nodes pre-bootstrapped.
For example, during the previous bootstrap phase, 20
nodes are bootstrapped but only 10 are deployed. The
other 10 nodes that are not deployed are considered pre-
bootstrapped. However, this solution stresses too much on
foresight; and would not work at all if there are no extra
nodes to start with in the first place.
For a new node to join the network, the user must
undertake a procedure that is hard for an attacker but easy
for him/herself to accomplish. Upon successful completion
of the procedure, there should be a viable cryptographic
means for the new node to establish the necessary keys
for supporting all the basic communication modes. Our
rationale is to require the user to use a fair number of nodes
to help bootstrap the new node, as under our assumption it
is hard for an attacker to acquire that many nodes from the
user without raising the user’s suspicion.
To add a node to the network, a user has to follow these
instructions (Fig. 3):
1. set the SFC to “Add”, then switch on or reset the
new node in close proximity of the SFC;
2. put the new node, and any τ of the operating nodes
into the SFC;
3. seal the SFC;
4. wait for the “Done” indicator and then deploy the
nodes, with the old nodes first and the new node
last.
The technical detail behind the instructions is given below.
Denote the new node by w. When w is switched on, it
senses the medium for a signal. If a noise signal is sensed,
w sets a wake-up timer and goes to sleep until the wake-
up timer times out. This process continues until w wakes
up and senses no noise signal. This is the time when w
has been put into the SFC. Once w senses the channel is
clear, it broadcasts a HELLO packet. If there are more than
one new node, the other new nodes will also contend for
the medium and broadcast their HELLO packets. Once the
KDC stops hearing HELLO packets, it broadcasts an ADD
packet (reminder: the KDC has been set to “Add” mode).
The protocol is as follows, assuming the latest released
hash-chain hash by the KDC is Hs,i−1:
Protocol 3. (Closed environment in the SFC)
w : rw
R←[1, n− 1]
w → ∗ : HELLO‖rwG‖Nw
s→ ∗ : ADD‖[ADD]Hs,i
s→ ∗ : Hs,i
∀v ∈VSFC \{w},
v → s : {f(IDv)}Ksv‖[{f(IDv)}Ksv ]Ksv
s : rs
R←[1, n− 1]
Ksw is derived per Section 3.1
K′M









s→ u : θ2‖[θ2]Ksu
The pairwise keys Ksv (∀v ∈ VSFC \{w}) are used to
transport the key shares f(IDv) to the KDC. If there
are less than τ operating nodes, the KDC would not be
able to reconstruct the membership key KM , and the
KDC would not give w the necessary keying material
to join the network. If there are enough key shares to
reconstruct KM , the KDC would verify if the hash of the
reconstructed KM is the same as the stored H(KM ), and
if verification succeeds, the KDC dispatches the necessary
keying material to w.
u (randomly chosen) is delegated the task of
broadcasting K′M encrypted to existing members of the
network. This delegation is necessary because the SFC
would not be around when the nodes are deployed later.
In order for u to do this, u must be able to relay the KDC’s
message in an authenticable fashion. Getting Hs,i+1 from


































Figure 3. Procedure for adding a node where τ = 2
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Delegation to u After the nodes ∈ VSFC \{w} have
been taken out of the SFC and returned to their original
locations, u broadcasts a RENEW packet:
Protocol 4.
u : θ = RENEW‖{K′M}KG
u→ ∗: θ‖[θ]Hs,i+1
u→ ∗: Hs,i+1
∗ : K′G = [0]KG
K′M is encrypted with KG so that only existing
operating nodes can receive K′M . Authentication is
provided by Hs,i+1. All nodes refresh the global key as
K′G = [0]KG .
Neighbor discovery by w After the new node w has
been taken out of the SFC and fixed at its intended
location, it initiates neighbor discovery, by broadcasting
a JOIN packet. It is possible that when w broadcasts its
JOIN packet, w’s neighbors have not received K′M yet,
so would ignore w’s request. w would have to keep on
trying until any of its neighbors respond, or until a certain
retry limit is reached, depending on which event occurs
first. A neighbor v, on hearing the w’s JOIN packets in
its operating phase instead of its deployment phase, would
respond by unicasting the necessary keying material to w.
After neighbor discovery (delineated by a certain time-
out), w becomes a regular member of the network. The
protocol is as follows:
Protocol 5.
w → ∗ : JOIN‖{NID‖KIDw}K′
M
∀v ∈Nw,
v : Kvw ← H(x) where x ∈ κv ∩κw
θ1 = KIDv‖Hv,iv‖Nv
v → w: θ1‖[θ1]Kvw
w : Kvw ← H(x) where x ∈ κv ∩κw
w → v : Hw,0‖[Hw,0‖Nv]Kvw
After neighbor discovery (signalled by a certain time-
out), every node generates deterministically a function
f(x) based on K′M per Equation 1, stores f(IDv) and
discards all the coefficients as well as K′M . The old key
share is also deleted.
Proposition 1. Suppose an attacker is within range of
the BSN and hence has control over the air interface of
the BSN throughout the operation lifetime of the BSN,
but does not have physical access to any of the nodes.
Suppose the hash chain Hs,i = H(Ci+1‖Hs,i+1) is used,
where Ci is the counter corresponding to the ith hash, and
|Ci| = c. ProvidedH : {0, 1}c+m → {0, 1}m is an aPre-
secure hash function that is indifferentiable from a random
oracle, the attacker’s advantage in adding a node to the
BSN is at most 1− (1− 2−m)q , where q is the number of
calls of H() made by the attacker.
Proof
By definition, an attacker successfully adds a node w
to the network when w successfully establishes a secure
channel with at least one of w’s neighbors. However,
w’s neighbors would only respond to w’s JOIN request
after they have received a RENEW command. To achieve
this, the attacker needs to forge a RENEW command,
which requires the attacker to forge Hi+1 (subscript s is
dropped for simplicity) at the very least. The attacker’s
advantage in forging Hi+1 is the probability of the
attacker, with knowledge of the released keys H0, H1,
..., Hi, finding x such that H(Ci+1‖x) = Hi. Formally,





(x≫ m) = Ci+1 ∧H(x) = Hi
∣∣
Hi−1 ← H(Ci|Hi) ∧ ... ∧H0 ← H(C1|H1)
]
.
Note: ∧ represents logical AND, not intersection. Provided




(x≫ m) = Ci+1 ∧H(x) = Hi
]
.
Let us define algorithm A0 as follows (where X is the
domain, y is the target hash value, and q is the number
of queries):
Algorithm A0(h,y,q)
choose X0 ⊆ X: |X0| = q ∧ (x≫ m) = Ci+1, ∀x ∈ X0
foreach x ∈ X0 { ifH(x) = y then return x }
return FAILURE
In the random oracle model, every x ∈ X0 has a
probability of 2−m being mapped to y. The success
probability of algorithm A0 is therefore A0 = 1−
Pr[no x is mapped to y] = 1− (1− 2−m)q . In fact, algo-
rithm A0 can be shown to be the optimal algorithm, i.e.,
using any other algorithm A, A ≤ A0 . We prove this by
induction on q. Let q = 1. A might start with a subset
X0 that does not contain only elements that have prefix
Ci+1. Among the x’s that have prefix Ci+1, each of them
has a probability of 2−m of being mapped to y, so A ≤
A0 for q = 1. Suppose A ≤ A0 for q = k − 1. When
q = k, A = Pr[preimage not found in the previous k − 1
steps]Pr[preimage found in the kth step] + Pr[preimage
found in the previous k − 1 steps], i.e.,
A ≤ (1− 2−m)k−12−m + 1− (1− 2−m)k−1
= 1− (1− 2−m)k
Hence, A ≤ A0 also holds for q = k. The above result
can actually be obtained by comparing algorithm A0 with
algorithm FindPreimage [62] – they are the same except on
how X0 is chosen.
Algorithm FindPreimage(h,y,q)
choose X0 ⊆ X with |X0| = q
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foreach x ∈ X0 { ifH(x) = y then return x }
return FAILURE
Therefore, Adv(A) ≤ 1− (1− 2−m)q .
10. NODE REMOVAL
When a node is removed from a BSN (detectable by
time-out), future key secrecy (FKS) must be enforced,
i.e., new group (global) keys must not be known by old
members [61].
To remove a node, the only instruction a user has to
follow is to switch off the node. All the keys are supposed
to be stored in the RAM of the node, so once the node is
switched off, all the keys are lost, and FKS is preserved. As
mentioned, to reduce accidental switch-offs, a mechanism
should be in place that requires a certain amount of
cognitive effort from the user to switch off the device.
What might happen is that an attacker might steal one
or more of the nodes to read out the global key. Since there
is no KDC in the network, there is no means to refresh
the global key immediately, the strategy is to ensure each
sensor monitor its neighbors’ keep-alive packets. A node
considers itself removed from the network when it received
at most τ − 2 keep-alive packets for a keep-alive interval.
Consider τ ≥ 2 for now; τ = 1 will be considered as a
special case later. Once a node considers itself removed
from the network, it erases all keys in its RAM. The
rationale for this algorithm is as follows. If a node is
removed from a network together with at most τ − 2
neighbors, then the node will receive at most τ − 2 keep-
alives per keep-alive interval, and the node will consider
itself removed from the network. If a node is removed
from a network together with at least τ − 1 neighbors, or
in other words, at least τ nodes have been removed from
the network, then by Assumption 3, the user will become
aware of the attack attempt. Note the special case of τ = 1:
a node does not check for keep-alive packets, because by
Assumption 3, a user is aware of the theft of even a single
node.
There are a few design considerations regarding this
algorithm:
• Keep-alive packets must be authenticated and fresh
to prevent an attacker from forging keep-alive
packets or replaying past keep-alive packets. This
is readily achievable by using cluster hash chains.
• A keep-alive interval must be less than the time
required by an attacker to successfully read out the
keys in the RAM of the node, but more than the
time required for putting τ nodes in an SFC. Per
Assumption 2, a keep-alive interval can be as high
as 60 minutes, but more experience with the users
and the actual hardware is needed to finetune the
timing for the optimal tradeoff between usability
and security.
11. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF
PROTOCOLS
While Proposition 1 gives the probability of an attacker
adding a node to a BSN, it rules out active attacks like the
planting of malicious nodes in the BSN that actively attack
the protocols (notice the phrase “not have physical access”
in Proposition 1). In the face of active attacks, we prove
the security of Protocols 1 to 5 by formal verification. For
this, we use the automated tools ProVerif‡ and Scyther§.
ProVerif is a theorem prover that represents a protocol by a
set of Horn clauses. ProVerif supports unbounded number
of sessions and unbounded message space. Scyther is a tool
that uses symbolic analysis with backwards search based
on partially ordered patterns (which represent infinite sets
of traces). Scyther supports unbounded number of sessions
but only guarantees termination for bounded number of
sessions.
We use Scyther as our primary tool because (i) to
specify simple protocols, its security protocol definition
language is easier to use, and (ii) it has a convenient user
interface. However, since Scyther does not support DH, we
resort to ProVerif for Protocol 1 and 3. To simulate the
SFC in Protocol 1 and Protocol 3, we declare a private
free channel in ProVerif. To simulate DH, we use the
equation construct:
fun dh/2. fun g/1.
equation dh(x,g(y)) = dh(y,g(x)).
Using Scyther is rather straightforward for the other
protocols. For each of the protocols, we verify that the
secrecy of the relevant keys is maintained, and that mutual
authentication property among the principals is achieved.
Specifically, for Protocols 2 and 5, we have verified that
even when KM is compromised, the session key Kuv (or
Kvw) is secure as long as the key shared by v and u
(or w) is not compromised. Finally, since neither ProVerif
and Scyther support the delayed preimage disclosure
mechanism used in the one-way hash chain, verification of
Protocol 4 has not been performed. The ProVerif script for
Protocol 1 is provided in the Appendix. The Scyther scripts
for the other protocols are available on the first author’s
home page¶.
12. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiments are carried out on two major hardware
platforms: Crossbow TelosB and Crossbow IRIS running
TinyOS 2.x to evaluate the practicality of KALwEN.
These two platforms are chosen because of their opposing
characteristics: TelosB has more RAM than IRIS (10
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TelosB (128 KB vs 48 KB); TelosB’s transceiver CC2420
supports hardware AES encryption but IRIS does not. Our
IRIS implementation uses the Flash memory as much as
possible, for example, the tables of a block cipher are all
stored in the Flash memory.
We benchmark the bootstrap protocol (Protocol 1)
because it involves the most public-key cryptographic
operations. We first choose the key size. For a security
margin of 2012, a symmetric key of at least 80 bits
should be used [63]. The definition of security margin
here follows that of Lenstra and Verheul [63]: suppose
(1) cDES is the number of computations required to break
DES, (2) cX is the number of computations required to
break algorithm X , and (3) an attacker that can afford
cDES computations starting from year 1982 can afford cX
computations starting from year y, then the security margin
of algorithm X is y. Corresponding to a security margin
of 2012, an ECC key bit-length of between 149 and 165
should be used [63]. So we pick 160-bit ECC keys.
In the benchmarking results below, by convention, we
write ROM size to refer to the size of the text (program
code) and data (initialized data) segments; and RAM size
to refer to the size of the data and bss (uninitialized
data) segments. Maximum run-time stack size on the
TelosB, obtained using MSPSim, is also provided. There is
currently no instruction-level simulator for measuring run-
time stack usage on the IRIS.
Block cipher 80-bit cipher Skipjack has been chosen by
Karlof et al. [64], and by Law et al. [65] for applications
with low security requirements. However, TelosB supports
hardware AES encryption, so we use AES for TelosB and
expand the block cipher key size to 128 bits on TelosB. On
IRIS, Skipjack is used. For hardware-accelerated AES, we
use Zhu’s code‖ whereas for Skipjack we use Law et al.’s
code [65], which uses less RAM than the implementation
in TinySec [64].
MAC The natural choice for a MAC to be used with
a block cipher is CBC-MAC because it is simple and
provably secure [66]. Our implementation of CBC-MAC
follows the “length prepending” variant [66, p.395]. Fig. 4
compares AES-CBC-MAC, Skipjack-CBC-MAC, TuLP
and TuLP-128 [67]. TuLP and its more secure variant
TuLP-128 are two MAC algorithms proposed recently
for resource-constrained devices [67]. TuLP and TuLP-
128 have similar code size as AES, but significantly
lower RAM usage than AES. Performance-wise however,
TuLP and TuLP-128 fare worse than AES-CBC-MAC
and Skipjack-CBC-MAC. Gong et al.’s results suggest
that TuLP and TuLP-128 are more suitable for hardware
implementation [67]. Of particular interest is that on
TelosB, hardware-accelerated AES-CBC-MAC is slower
‖http://cis.sjtu.edu.cn/index.php/The_Standalone_AES_
Encryption_of_CC2420_(TinyOS_2.10_and_MICAz)
than software AES-CBC-MAC and Skipjack-CBC-MAC.
As the implementation only makes use of the internals
of TinyOS, namely the components ActiveMessageC,
HplCC2420PinsC, CC2420SpiC, CC2420SpiWireC, the
performance bottleneck of the hardware AES routine is
thought to lie amidst one or some of these components.
We are aware of an article that reports a better performance
result for CC2420-accelerated AES [68] but the authors are
not able to provide their code. We opt to use hardware-
accelerated AES-CBC-MAC on TelosB anyway, in the
hope that this performance bottleneck will be removed in
the future. On IRIS, Skipjack-CBC-MAC is the clear all-
around winner.
ECDH To implement ECDH, we use the publicly
available TinyECC [44]. We are aware of more optimized
ECC implementations, such as NanoECC [69] and
Driessen et al.’s [70], but they are not publicly available.
We choose the domain parameters secp160r1 [71].
According to Table II, secp160k1 offers the best code
size; secp160r2 is similar to secp160k1 in speed but
worse than secp160k1 in size; secp160r1 offers the
best key agreement time. We choose secp160r1 for
our experiments. Many researchers choose secp160r1
by default but to our knowledge, this is the first time
the selection is justified performance-wise. When using
TinyECC, all the optimizations are enabled for reasonable
performance in human terms (seconds are good, tens of
seconds are too long).
Hash function On TelosB, it is possible to take advan-
tage of the hardware AES to construct a hardware-
accelerated hash function using the Davies-Meyer con-
struction [72], that could be faster [73] than SHA-1.
This approach is employed by Andersen [36]. However,
SHA-1 is the only supported hash function in the ECC
standard [43], so we use SHA-1 as the hash function.
Table II. Comparison of domain parameters in terms of (i)
the initialization time of ECDH in seconds, (ii) the ECDH key
agreement time in seconds, (iii) the ROM size of the domain
parameters in bytes, (iv) the maximum run-time stack size of
ECDH in bytes, (v) the ROM size of ECDH excluding the domain
parameters in bytes, and (vi) the RAM size of ECDH in bytes.
Domain parameters by themselves use 0 RAM.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
TelosB
secp160k1 2.62 2.78 530 750
11166 1866secp160r1 2.61 2.66 532 740
secp160r2 2.60 2.79 544 750
IRIS
secp160k1 1.88 2.10 492 N/A
14480 1774secp160r1 1.86 1.76 776 N/A
secp160r2 1.87 2.12 576 N/A
Network bootstrapping For benchmarking the bootstrap
protocol (Protocol 1), up to 12 regular nodes are first
12
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Figure 4. Performance and resource usage of (i) hardware AES-CBC-MAC, (ii) software AES-CBC-MAC, (iii) Skipjack-CBC-MAC, (iv)
TuLP, (v) TuLP-128 on TelosB (top row) and IRIS (bottom row). Note: IRIS does not support hardware AES-CBC-MAC; stack size
information is not available for IRIS.
switched on, followed by an additional node acting as the
SFC. We measure the time between when the first HELLO
packet arrives at the SFC and when the last BOOT packet
arrives at a regular node. Note that the acknowledgement
packets on the last line of Protocol 1 are not taken into
account because these packets can be piggybacked on
the suitable messages in Protocol 3 (on line 6 to be
exact). The results are in Fig. 5. The optimal case is
when the SFC bootstraps each node right after another.
When this happens, ignoring computation time except for
ECDH key agreement, and ignoring communication times
(backoff timers, transmission latencies etc.), the time to
bootstrap a network of N nodes is 2.66N for TelosB, and
is 1.76N for IRIS (we get the constants 2.66 and 1.76
from Table II). Fig. 5 shows that the times to bootstrap
nodes are reasonably close to the optima. For example, the
time to bootstrap 12 nodes is a little under 25 seconds,
which should be acceptable to most users. Clearly, the
bootstrap latency can be further improved by using a more
capable processor or an ECC accelerator for the SFC (an
ECC processor has even become feasible on an RFID tag
nowadays [74]).
Network deployment During deployment, the nodes
perform neighbor discovery to establish pairwise keys and
distribute the commitment of their cluster hash chain to
their neighbors (Protocol 2). In the protocol, each node
sendsO(n− 1)messages, so the total number of messages
is O(n(n− 1)). In our implementation, at the start of
deployment, every node sets a time-out of 2000 clock ticks.
Before the time-out, every node contends for the medium
to send its JOIN packet. At time-out, every node knows
how many neighbors it has based on the JOIN packets
it received. It sorts the neighbor IDs, and determines the
position of its ID among the sorted neighbor IDs. Say its
ID ranks at the ith place among the neighbor IDs, then
it will schedule to transmits its replies to JOIN requests
(i− 1)(n− 1)× 20 ticks later. Note that there are (n−
1) JOIN requests to reply to, and 20 ticks are allocated to
the transmission of each reply. Using this algorithm, the
time required to deploy n nodes is
(2000 + n(n− 1)× 20)/1024 seconds. (2)
Fig. 6 shows the experimental times required to deploy
up to 12 nodes, which are close to the prediction using
(2). Although the time is quadratic in n, taking under 4.5
seconds to deploy 12 nodes seems reasonable.
13. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first describe how KALwEN can be
applied to User Scenarios 1 & 2 in Section 1. Then,
we compare in detail KALwEN with three complete
BSN key management schemes: BLIG [35, 36], the KLS
scheme [37] as well as the LYLR scheme [38]. Finally, we
address some of the potential criticism against KALwEN.
13.1. Applying KALwEN to User Scenarios 1&2
Suppose an elderly COPD patient is prescribed a BSN.
The BSN is for gait monitoring and fall prevention, and
for monitoring the patient’s ECG and breathing. KALwEN
enables the gait monitoring sensors to communicate
securely with the fall prevention actuators and vice versa.
When the gait monitoring sensors detect a fall, they
broadcast a PANIC signal. The ECG and respiratory
sensors authenticate the PANIC signal, and broadcast
their readings. If there is an SMS-capable device in the
network, it will authenticate the PANIC signal, the ECG
and respiratory sensor readings; and send an emergency
13













































Figure 5. Timing figures for the bootstrap protocol (Protocol 1)



































































Figure 6. Timing figures for the neighbor discovery protocol
(Protocol 2) on TelosB and IRIS. Dashed lines represent
prediction using (2).
text to the patient’s caregiver. All broadcasts are secured
using KALwEN’s global key and cluster hash chains.
To set up a telemedicine session, the patient needs
to add an Internet-capable LPU to the network so that
his/her physiological data can be transmitted to a remote
specialist. To do so, supposing the system parameter τ =
2, the patient bootstraps the LPU with two of already
deployed sensors in the SFC. After bootstrapping, the LPU
is able to join the network. After the telemedicine session,
the patient simply removes the LPU from the network.
13.2. Comparison
A mainly qualitative comparison is given in Table III. It
is impossible to compare all four protocols on an equal
footing, because of the different security objectives and
threat models used. Perhaps the only commonality of all
proposals is that they all use public-key cryptography.
BLIG is the simplest scheme because it does not support
batch deployment and considers forward key secrecy a
violation of functionality. KALwEN has relatively high
complexity because of the harsh imposed constraints
and the stringent security objectives. KALwEN caters
for the absence of an LPU, and makes allowance for
nodes to be removed from the user’s body without the
user’s knowledge. The following distinction is particularly
important: in other schemes, a compromised node can
forge broadcast packets using the identity of other nodes;
in KALwEN, this attack is not feasible because broadcast
is authenticated. In the KLS scheme, a healthcare worker
is absolutely trustworthy. In KALwEN, the user trusts
only himself/herself. In the LYLR scheme, pairwise keying
material are transmitted encrypted using the group key,
allowing every node to know the pairwise key of every
pair of nodes in the network – this is the price that LYLR
pays for its better bootstrap performance than KALwEN.
KALwEN makes the best effort in isolating nodes from
each other to minimize the impact of a single node’s
compromise.
In terms of equipment, BLIG relies on the user
to confirm every node addition by comparing blinking
patterns; the KLS scheme adds on BLIG an extra layer of
security – a healthcare worker; the LYLR scheme relies
on the user to perform visual comparison of blinking
patterns and to count the number of nodes; these are the
compromises they make for dispensing with a Faraday
cage. Our design is to make operation as easy and
foolproof for the user as possible – no cognitive effort for
comparing blinking patterns, no counting, no need to add
nodes one by one – therefore the SFC is introduced.
In terms of formal proof, the node discovery protocol
of the KLS scheme is proved by the Burrows-Abadi-
Needham (BAN) logic [75]. The catch of BAN logic is that
it assumes all principals are honest, and the KLS scheme
makes exactly this assumption. Our protocols are proved
in the stronger Dolev-Yao model using theorem provers.
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Table III. Detailed comparison of BSN key management schemes. Legend: N/A=Not Applicable, L=Low, M=Medium, H=High.
BLIG [35, 36] KLS [37] LYLR [38] KALwEN
Devices per user
An authorization node and regu-
lar nodes
Patient’s controller, healthcare
worker’s controller and regular
nodes
User’s controller and regular
nodes
User’s SFC and regular nodes





• Secure broadcast by the




the nodes: group key
• Secure unicast: pairwise key
• Secure broadcast by the KDC
(delegated): global key and
global hash chain
• Secure broadcast by the
nodes: global key and cluster
hash chain
• Secure unicast: pairwise key
Batch deployment
No No Yes, using the group device
pairing protocol:
• Group key is established
using a multi-party extension
of Diffie-Hellman key
agreement [76]
• The controller distributes the
necessary keying material for
authenticated broadcast and
secure unicast to the nodes,
encrypted using the group
key
Yes, using the bootstrap
protocol (Protocol 1)
Performance on TelosB N/A 25s for 3–10 nodes 5–40s for 2–12 nodes
Estimated complexity N/A H H
Node addition
• The joining node initiates
a public-key-based protocol
with the authorization node
and a deployed node
• The authorization node cre-
ates a log entry
• The deployed node gives the
joining node the group key
• The patient’s controller initi-
ates a public-key-based pro-
tocol with a newly discov-
ered node and the healthcare
worker’s device
• The new node creates and
shares a pairwise key with the
patient’s controller
• The healtcare worker’s device
sends a signed authorization
message to the patient’s con-
troller and to the new node
A few more steps on top of the
group device pairing protocol
A few more steps on top of the
bootstrap protocol
Estimated complexity H M H H
...to be continued on page 16
13.3. Answers to Potential Criticism
“Is interoperability a realistic requirement?” For the
ALwEN project, Roessingh Research and Development∗∗
is making activity sensors whereas Holst Center†† is
making ECG sensors. These sensors are from different
∗∗http://www.rrd.nl
††http://www.holstcentre.com
makers and they must interoperate with each other. Li
et al. s work [38] also supports our interoperability
requirement. On the contrary, we think it is unrealistic to
assume a manufacturer would make all the sensors that end
up in a BSN.
“Why not use factory pre-assigned symmetric keys?”
We first preclude the possibility of assigning the same
key to all devices from the same manufacturer. Suppose
every device has a unique pre-assigned key, and suppose a
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Table III. (Continued from page 15) Detailed comparison of BSN key management schemes. Legend: N/A=Not Applicable, L=Low,
M=Medium, H=High.
BLIG KLS LYLR KALwEN
Node removal
Does not support forward key
secrecy
• Intentional removal: the
patient uses its controller to
distribute a new group key
• Malicious removal: detection
mechanism is unspecified
• Intentional removal: the
patient uses its controller to
distribute a new group key
using logical key
hierarchy [77] for better
efficiency than the preceding
scheme
• Malicious removal: detection
mechanism is unspecified
• A node listens for keep-alive
packets from its neighbors
• Failure to receive at least
τ − 1 keep-alive packets
within a keep-alive interval
indicates removal (either
intentional or malicious) and
keying material is erased
Estimated complexity N/A L M L
Formal security proofs
No Node discovery protocol proved
by BAN logic
No Automated proof using theorem
prover ProVerif and Scyther
Security level L L M H
user has n devices. The user needs to manually distribute
n− 1 keys (of other devices) to every device, so that the
devices can establish a group key, amongst other keys.
This is a combined effort of O(n2) on the user’s behalf.
Furthermore, there is the logistics problem: the user has to
keep track of the pre-assigned keys. Obviously, the keys
must not be printed on the devices.
“Nodes do not need to communicate with each other.”
In some applications, the nodes do need to interact
with each other; for example, for time synchronization,
context generation. See User Scenario 2 for a concrete
example, which motivates the requirement for in-network
processing.
“The SFC should be replaced by the personal
computer.” While the personal computer (PC) has
become a common household appliance, computer literacy
among the elderly remains low. In addition, the SFC offers
several definite advantages over the PC:
• The SFC supports batch deployment in a closed
secure environment, whereas the PC does not.
• The SFC presents a dedicated interface to the user
and is hassle-free in terms of software maintenance.
• The average PC nowadays is under constant threats
of cyber-attacks from the Internet. The number of
viruses was estimated to have topped 1 million in
2009 [78]. According to the Anti-Phishing Working
Groups Phishing Activity Trends Report for Q3 of
2009, 48.35% of 22,754,847 scanned computers
remain infected with malware. The problem has
become so serious that in Australia several drastic
measures have been recommended in the recent
parliamentary report “Hackers, Fraudsters and
Botnets: Tackling the Problem of Cyber Crime”.
One of the recommendations is to disconnect
infected computers until they are disinfected. The
standalone nature of the SFC thus compares
favorably with the virus-ridden state of the PC.
“The SFC is impractical.” The introduction of the SFC
can be seen as a necessary evil, because an out-of-range
attacker can eavesdrop on short-range communication
using only low-cost equipment [56]. We do not believe the
SFC should be a usability barrier based on the reasoning
that it does not yet exist, because wireless sensors did not
exist until a few years ago. The bootstrap and node addition
procedures consist of only 4 steps each. We also note that
other existing designs such as Kuo et al.’s [11] and Blink
’Em All [22] also employ special equipment (Faraday cage
and video camera respectively) for bootstrapping multiple
nodes at the same time.
While an estimation of the production cost of the
SFC cannot be provided, the intention here is to provide
an outline of an inexpensive construction. A basic SFC
requires only the following components:
1. a dial and three light indicators;
2. a high-end sensor node as the KDC;
3. a low-end sensor node as the RF jammer;
4. interface logic connecting the dial and indicators to
the KDC and the RF jammer;
5. a tamper-evident metal enclosure.
We mention in Assumption 1 that the SFC is tamper-
resistant, but in practice, it is sufficient to make the SFC
tamper-evident. So long as the user does not use the SFC
when he/she spots evidence of tampering, there is no
security breach.
“Why use the SFC as the KDC?” For one, the SFC
is more resourceful than the nodes. Secondly, it is more
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cost-effective to make the SFC tamper-resistant than to
make every node tamper-resistant. Thirdly, this is due to
the relaxation of the assumption that there is an LPU.
“Is the design really suitable for the low power
operation of BSNs?” Experimental results provided in
Section 12 on two major sensor network platforms –
TelosB and IRIS – strongly indicate that KALwEN is
indeed suitable for the low operation of BSNs.
“The keys-erased-once-switched-off mechanism is
impractical because node resets due to exception
handling could be common.” The switching off of a
node by a user is a clear sign that the user is making a
conscious decision to remove the node from the network.
The reseting of a node due to exception handling is a clear
sign that something is wrong with the software. Proper
exception handling does not reset a node. Unhandled
exceptions such as memory access errors could reset a
node. Unhandled exceptions such as infinite loops do
require a node to be reset, but if a healthcare device
frequently encounters such errors, it is unfit for healthcare
purposes in the first place.
14. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
KALwEN is a key management architecture for BSNs. It
combines the cryptographic techniques of ECDH, com-
binatorial key pre-distribution, authenticated broadcast by
one-way hash chains and threshold secret sharing in
a complete framework. KALwEN addresses the usabil-
ity, interoperability, hardware constraints and deployment
issues of BSNs. In terms of usability, a user without
expert knowledge needs but to follow a simple set of
instructions to bootstrap or extend a network. Through
user-friendly procedures, sensor devices from different
manufacturers that expectedly do not have any pre-shared
secret can establish secure communications with each
other. The cryptographic primitives used by KALwEN
are lightweight enough to run on sensor node hardware.
KALwEN is decentralized so that it does not depend on
the availability of an LPU. While supporting secure global
broadcast, local broadcast and local unicast, KALwEN is
able to preserve past key secrecy and future key secrecy.
The fact that all the cryptographic protocols of KALwEN
have been formally verified also makes a convincing case.
Experimental results showing that bootstrapping 12 IRIS
nodes takes a little under 25 seconds are a strong indication
that KALwEN is practical. KALwEN at this stage is a
proposal for addressing the constraints in Section 1; more
tests are pending for substantiating the usability claim.
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APPENDIX: PROVERIF SCRIPT FOR
PROTOCOL 1
(* A public channel. *)
free net.
(* A private channel associated with the SFC.*)
private free sfc.
(* Message tags. *)
free hello,boot.
(* The name of a compromised agent. *)
free spy.
(* Private channels for agent initalization. *)
private free initialInitiatorData.
private free initialResponderData.
(* Symmetric encryption functions. *)
fun encrypt/2.
reduc decrypt(encrypt(x,y),y)=x. (* y = the key *)
fun mac/2.
fun h/1.
(* Cryptographic constructors. *)
fun pencrypt/2. (* asymmetric encryption *)
fun enc/1. (* extracts encryption key *)
fun dec/1. (* extracts decryption key *)
(* Cryptographic destructors. *)
reduc pdecrypt(pencrypt(x,enc(y)),dec(y)) = x.
(* Constructor maps agents to secret key-pairs. *)
private fun keypair/1.
(* A lookup function for public keys. *)
reduc pubkey(agent) = enc(keypair(agent)).
(* Diffie-Hellman (DH) function *)
fun dh/2.
fun g/1.
equation dh(x,g(y)) = dh(y,g(x)).
(* The queries. *)







(* The initiator process. *)
let initiator =
in(initialInitiatorData, (idv,rv));
! (* model arbitrary no. of sessions *)
new nv;
out(sfc, (idv, hello, g(rv), nv));
in(sfc, (msgv, macv));
let (ids, =idv, =boot, grs, ctextv, ns) = msgv in
let ksv = dh(rv, grs) in
let km = decrypt(ctextv, ksv) in
20
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if mac((nv, msgv), ksv) = macv then
(if ids<>spy then event endRespAuth(ids, idv))





(* The responder process. *)
let responder =
in(initialResponderData, (ids,rs,km));
! (* model arbitrary no. of sessions *)
in(sfc, (idv, =hello, grv, nv));
new ns;
let ksv = dh(rs, grv) in
let ctextv = encrypt(km, ksv) in
let msgv = (ids, idv, boot, g(rs), ctextv, ns) in








(* The initializer process. *)
let initializer =
new agent; (* generate agent name *)
new km; (* membership key *)
(* compute public encryption key-pair *)
let pkp = keypair(agent) in
(* launch initiator role *)
out(initialInitiatorData, (agent,dec(pkp)));
(* launch responder role *)
out(initialResponderData, (agent,dec(pkp),km));
(* publish the public data *)
out(net, (agent, enc(pkp))).
(* The compromised agent. *)
let compromised =
(* compute public encryption key-pair *)
let pkp = keypair(spy) in
(* publish the key-pair to model compromise *)
out(net, pkp).
(* The system. *)
process
!initiator (* initiators *)
| !responder (* responders *)
| compromised (* the spy *)
| !initializer
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